B. F. Skinner is one of the major figures behind the study of operant (or instrumental) conditioning—a type of learning where behaviors are influenced by their consequences. This kind of learning, however, has been around for quite some time. Early empirical work in this subject began in the late 19th century with the work of Edwin L. Thorndike. Going back much further, in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, we find one of the earliest (if not the earliest) formal discussions of the processes underlying operant conditioning.

Instrumental Learning in Aristotle

Aristotle's mention of instrumental learning is quite brief. (The main focus of the Nicomachean Ethics is ethics and so indirectly treats subjects like learning as they have to do with the development of ethical behavior.) Critically, Aristotle and Skinner disagree about the role of instrumental learning in governing people's behavior. Skinner considers instrumental learning as the cause of the majority of people's behavior, including verbal, moral, and social behavior. For Aristotle, instrumental learning only makes up a small part of what governs people's behavior. To better compare and contrast Skinner and Aristotle's ideas of instrumental learning, a few important details about the philosophical presuppositions of both of these figures will be mentioned.

Starting with Aristotle, an understanding of the four causes and the hierarchy of being are needed to understand Aristotle's position on instrumental learning (and indirectly, his position on operant conditioning). A complete explanation of the changes we see in the natural objects of everyday life involves four causes for Aristotle. These include material (what is it made of), efficient (where did it come from), formal (what is it, essentially), and final causation (the purpose, goal, or end of a thing). All of these four causes must be present together and proceed in relation to one another.

The Hierarchy of Being

The hierarchy of being is the hierarchy of formal causes of natural objects (beings) in the world. At the bottom of this hierarchy are inanimate bodies (non-living beings). The formal cause of these substances includes the properties or features of that make it what it is. The remainder of beings in this hierarchy are all living beings. For any living substance, the formal cause is the life principle of the organism. Aristotle uses the term soul to refer to the formal cause of a living substance. As we move up in the hierarchy, each higher kind of soul takes on and adds to the powers of the lower ones.

Moving up in the hierarchy from inanimate bodies, there are vegetative beings. The formal cause of vegetative beings includes vital operations (in the form are powers for the sustenance of life). Next, there are sensitive beings. The formal cause of sensitive beings includes the powers of locomotion (unrestricted movement) and cognition (the basic operations of sensation and perception). Rational beings (people) are at the top of the hierarchy. The formal cause for rational beings includes the powers of intellect (in the form is the ability for abstracting universals beyond cognitive operations, i.e. knowing truth) and will (the exercising of choice over responses given the truth obtained by the intellect).

Two Sources of Behavior

Given these two philosophical presuppositions, people's behavior, for Aristotle, can come from at least two sources: environmental and internal causes. Environmental causes would be those aspects of an environment that affect vegetative and sensitive operations. These aspects of the environment would affect pleasure and pain (i.e. to use terms we are more familiar with in this course, appetitive and aversive stimuli).

In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle is arguing for an ethics grounded in human nature. The virtuous person is one who acts in accordance with goodness, towards the final cause for people which Aristotle refers to as happiness (not in the modern sense of contentment or pleasure, but in the classical sense meaning blessed or fulfilled). Happiness can be thought of as excellence. It is in the nature of people to know truth and act accordingly with the truth. An excellent life is one where truth is known by the intellect and the good that is known by the intellect is sought after in the exercise of the will.

We see the underlying ideas of operant conditioning in Aristotle's treatment of the question of whether happiness is learned or developed through habitual practice. The answer is more sophisticated than is presented here. The important point is that there is a degree of cooperation between intellectual understanding and habitual practice. For the young (those who are physically and those who are intellectually young), the rational powers of apprehending the good abstractly is being developed—and for some it is lacking. Their behavior can be shaped through external factors such as rewards for virtuous behavior and punishment for behavior that is lacking in virtue. Once a person has developed a rational principle, however, behavior comes from an exercise of the intellect and will (internal factors).

Instrumental learning can then be seen as a way to foster or develop intellectual learning. For people, intellectual learning is a higher operation than instrumental learning. We see this, for example, when we refer to a young adult as mature for making tough decisions without need for an explicit reward. Someone who adheres to an Aristotelian view would say that this person is developing a rational principle and is exercising their intellectual and moral powers. For animals who have sensitive souls, instrumental learning is the highest operation possible (given that they are lacking in intellect and will as evident by the lack of universals governing their behavior). In other words, operant conditioning could explain the complex behavior we see in animals, but it will only explain a small class of the behaviors we see in people.

Skinner on Instrumental Learning

Skinner's philosophical presuppositions can be understood in light of his commitment to radical behaviorism. He allows for internal variables to exist, however, they have no causal role in his view. In comparison to the four causes, only the material and efficient causes have any explanatory role when it comes to understanding behavior. This is why comparative psychology is used in radical behaviorism with the aim of explaining all of human behavior. Without formal causation, the difference between animals and people is illusory, unintelligible, or at the very least, nonsensical.

For Skinner, when we see what appears to be virtuous acts, we are only observing the effects of environmental factors on behavior. All of human behavior can be explained through reflexes, respondent learning (classical conditioning), and instrumental learning (operant conditioning). Behavior can be directed at some good only in as much as the environmental factors point it there. This is why Skinner considers free will to be an illusion. Nothing internal can have a causal role in behavior. Free will, as an internal variable, has no causal role in the behavior that people display. Essentially, Skinner denies that people are able to reason about universal concepts.

Conclusion

These two views paint starkly contrasting pictures of instrumental learning. The issue here must be resolved through critical thought and observation. It involves careful consideration of these philosophical presuppositions as well as considering the data available. The available data can be found through empirical study and the through our common sense experience. Both views can not be the correct answer. Either behavior is radically determined by environmental factors, or there is something more than just the control of the environment on human behavior.